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THE OCTOBER 1984 TERM: A COURTWATCHER'S
PERSPECTIVE
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.*
This article reports on the 1984-85 Burger Court. It is based on
the author's sabbatical project, which included attendance at all 155
oral arguments held during the October 1984 Term. The purpose is
to examine the Burger Court and to provide glimpses of events
which rarely, if ever, appear in the Court's written opinions.
I. SETTING THE STAGE
The Term prior to the October 1984 Term was one of the most
conservative of the post-1937 era. The Court was dominated by a
five-vote coalition of Justices including the conservative "four horse-
persons" (Justices Rehnquist, Burger, O'Connor, and Powell) and
Justice White. In a series of stunning victories during the October
1983 Term, the conservative wing adopted the views of the Justice
Department and routed the liberals, Brennan and Marshall, who re-
sponded with a string of blistering dissents.' Commentators across
the political spectrum declared that a new, more conservative era of
Supreme Court history had begun and predicted that the October
1984 Term would provide more of the same.'
© 1986 by Russell W. Galloway, Jr.
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law; Ph.D., 1970, Graduate Theological Union; Director, Supreme Court
History Project; member, California bar.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (good-faith exception to exclu-
sionary rule); Firefighters Local 1748 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) (affirmative action);
Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984) (preventive detention); Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct.
1355 (1984) (government manger scene); Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984) (sex
discrimination); Pennhurst State College v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1983) (eleventh
amendment).
2. TIM. magazine's October 8, 1984 cover story, for example, traced the recent history
of the Court, stating, "[Slince the appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor by President Reagan
in 1981, many experts have begun to discern a rightward tilt." Court at the Crossroads, TIME,
Oct. 8, 1984, at 28, col. 3. The article also observed that a Reagan reelection could produce "a
much more conservative Court, a Warren Court in reverse." Id. at 29, col. I. According to
TIME, the rightward shift would probably affect abortion, religion, criminal procedure, affirm-
ative action, free speech, and economic rights. Id.
Other commentators supported TIME's "rightward tilt" hypothesis. In July, 1984, for ex-
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On the day before the opening of the October 1984 Term, The
Washington Post's court reporters joined the chorus and predicted
that the rightward plunge would continue during the October 1984
Term, especially in cases involving church-state relations and crimi-
nal procedure. The reporters wrote:
If a "counterrevolution" happens this term, most expect it to
come in the field of religion .... Many analysts say they be-
lieve that the court will . . . carve out a new approach to future
church-state cases, stressing "accommodation" of religious activ-
ity instead of strict separation of government and religion.'
Similarly, referring to the widely-noted school-search case, New
Jersey v. T.L.O.,4 the reporters predicted, "The justices are likely to
do for school administrators this term what they did for police and
prison officials last term: further reduce judicially imposed obstacles
to officials' flexibility and control."'
II. THE COURT AND THE 1984 ELECTION
One of the main events of the October 1984 Term was the No-
vember 1984 presidential election. The 1984 Burger Court was the
second oldest Court ever; only the nine old men of the mid-1930's
Court were older.' On election day in 1984, the average age of the
ample, James Kilpatrick published an article which applauded "the court's four relatively
consistent conservatives-Burger, Rehnquist, O'Connor and Powell-[for] finally [getting]
their act together. They formed a solid working coalition with Justice White and occasionally
with Justice Blackmun. The result was nearly total frustration for the liberal wing." Kilpa-
trick, Court's Term Had Conservative Tone, Casper Star-Tribune, July 12, 1984, at AI0, cols.
1-2.
Elder Witt, Court analyst for the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, agreed. Witt contended
that the October 1983 Term was a "watershed term" in which the Court "[iun virtually every
area of law, . . .swung its weight to the side of the government," putting "its stamp of ap-
proval on the administration's proposals for significant changes in national policy on questions
of civil and individual rights, business, environmental and criminal law." Witt, Court Swings
to the Right, Gives Reagan Major Victories, CONG. Q., July 14, 1984, at 1709.
The late Joseph Kraft added to the consensus, labelling the October 1983 Term a turning
point in Supreme Court history. Kraft, At Last a Conservative Majority Emerges on the High
Court, Salt Lake Tribune, June 18, 1984, at A9, col. 1. "After years of fumbling," wrote Kraft,
"the Supreme Court under Warren Burger has finally evolved a coherent majority eager to
speak out confidently on doctrinal issues ... [which] reflect the views of a clear conservative
majority." Id.
3. Berbash & Kamen, Supreme Court to Address Church-State Relations, Police
Powers, The Washington Post, Sept. 30, 1984, at A4, col. 1.
4. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
5. Berbash & Kamen, supra note 3, at col. 4.
6. When Justice Van Devanter retired in 1937, the ages of the Justices were as follows:
Brandeis 80, Van Devanter 78, McReynolds 75, Sutherland 75, Hughes 75, Butler 71, Car-
dozo 67, and Roberts 62.
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Justices was 70.2 years. When Justice Blackmun turned seventy-six
on November 12, 1984, the Burger Court became the first Court
ever with five Justices aged seventy-six or older.7 Given the advanced
age of the Justices, commentators argued that the winner of the 1984
election could, quite conceivably, shape the Court for decades.'
Articles on this theme appeared in early 1984. 9 A column by
Washington Post staff writer David Broder summed up what was at
stake for the Court in the 1984 election.10 "[T]he aging tribunal is
likely to undergo major reconstruction" in the near future, Broder
contended, and he labelled this "probably the most important un-
publicized issue in this election."11 The issue was crucial, Broder
argued, because of "the huge gap between the fundamental philoso-
phies of these two men [Reagan and Mondale] on the role of law
and the judiciary in our society." '
In the months before the presidential election, the Justices gave
a\ series of speeches which some commentators interpreted as "stump
speeches" designed to influence the outcome of the election.1 First,
Stevens charged the conservatives with "overstepping judicial author-
ity" to achieve their desired results." Second, Marshall charged the
conservatives with failing to remedy constitutional violations.1
Third, Blackmun charged the conservatives with moving to the right
7. Will, The Aging of the Court, The Washington Post, Oct. 14,1984, at D7, cols. 2-3.
8. See, e.g., Kraft, At Last a Conservative Majority Emerges on the High Court, The
Salt Lake Tribune, June 18, 1984, at A9, col. 1.
9. See, e.g., Galloway, The Supreme Court and the 1984 Election, SANTA CLARA
MAGAZINE, Winter 1984, 19; Witt, Next President Likely to Reshape High Court, The San
Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 5, 1984, at AI0, col. I; Epstein, Next President May Mold High
Court, The San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
10. Broder, Where There's A Real Difference, The Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1984, at
C7, col. 6.
11. Id.
12. Id. Broder continued:
Reagan sees the law as a bulwark of existing social, political, and economic
arrangements. He would make the Supreme Court a forum for asserting states'
rights against federal standards or controls; a tribunal where property rights
were granted at least equal, if not superior status with claims of human rights;
and a place where traditional values and practices are defended against legisla-
tion or litigation aimed at changing the status quo ....
Mondale has seen the work of lawyers and judges as being part of the
ongoing struggle for social justice and individual rights.
Id.
13. See also infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
14. Remarks by Justice John P. Stevens, Dedication of Arthur Rubloff Building,
Northwestern University School of Law, Aug. 1, 1984.
15. Remarks by Justice Thurgood Marshall, Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit,
Hartford, Conn., Sept. 14, 1984.
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"by hook or by crook.""8 Fourth, Brennan charged that the Court
had "condoned both isolated and systematic violations of civil liber-
ties" in recent cases and that, "[m]ore and more Americans are turn-
ing to state courts for relief in defending constitutional rights because
they are afraid that the U.S. Supreme Court won't help them."'"
This public criticism was, according to one commentator, "nothing
short of extraordinary.' 8 The Justices "are giving the appearance of
being out on the hustings. ' '
In addition to these speeches, Rehnquist got into the act with an
October 19, 1984 speech in which he all but invited Reagan to pack
the Court with ultra-conservatives. Rehnquist contended that presi-
dents should appoint people who they believe agree with them, be-
cause that's how current public opinion is infused into the Court. As
Rehnquist put it, "There is no reason in the world why a president
should not ... appoint people ... who are sympathetic to his politi-
cal or philosophical principles."20 Rehnquist tried to downplay the
likelihood that Reagan courtpacking would produce an ultra-con-
servative Court by stressing that presidents often guess incorrectly
and that the Court fosters individualism rather than bloc-voting. 2
16. In violation of the rules of the Cosmos Club, a Washington, D.C. social club, mem-
bers of the audience leaked Justice Blackmun's "off the record" speech to the press, which
reported it. See, e.g., Kamen, Blackmun Says "Weary" Court is Shifting Right, The Washing-
ton Post, Sept. 20, 1984, at I, cols. 3-5.
17. Berbash, Brennan Says Rulings Violated Civil Liberties, The Washington Post,
Oct. 25, 1984, at 1, col. 1. Fred Berbash, Post staff writer, suggested that the minority justices
were possibly trying to influence the presidential election by pointing out the Court's reaction-
ary trend and warning that a Reagan reelection would exacerbate the trend. Id. According to
Berbash, the swing to the right began in January 1984, when Powell and White began siding
regularly with Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Burger to produce a solid conservative Majority.
Thereafter, "Day after day, in case after case, the court moved in the same direction-to the
right-with the same solid conservative majority at the helm." Id. "The shift," Berbash con-
tinued, "has isolated Blackmun, Stevens, Marshall and Justice William J. Brennan Jr." Id. at
col 4.
18. Berbash, Justices Making Their Frustrations Public, The Washington Post, Sept.
23, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
19. Id.
20. Speech by Justice William H. Rehnquist, University of Minnesota College of Law,
Minneapolis, Minn., Oct. 19, 1984.
21. Id. Rehnquist's speech was labelled a stump speech by several commentators. Al
Kamen of the Washington Post contended that the speech was designed to affect the presiden-
tial election by neutralizing Mondale's claim that people should vote Democratic to prevent
Reagan from packing the Court with Jerry Falwell supporters. Kamen, "Court-Packing"
Backed in Rehnquist Speech, The Washington Post, Oct. 20, 1984, at A9, col. 2. See also
infra note 23 and accompanying text. Similarly, American University Professor Herman
Schwartz wrote that Rehnquist's speech was intended to support Reagan by misleading the
public into thinking that presidents can't predict what their appointees will do once on the
Court. Actually, Schwartz pointed out, presidents normally do predict quite accurately what
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Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court did not become a ma-
jor issue in the November 1984 election. Mondale and Ferraro made
a few efforts to scare people with the specter of a "Falwell Court '..
packed with right-wing Christian fundamentalists. Mondale's prob-
lem, however, was that the American people were apparently glad
that Reagan would have the opportunity to pack the Court with con-
servatives." Therefore, Mondale was not in a position to exploit the
Court issue.
Ironically, however, Reagan was also unable to use the Court
issue, because, at seventy-four, he did not want anyone's age to be-
come an election issue. George Will summed up the stalemate on the
issue as follows:
The "court issue" probably favors President Reagan because, to
many voters and especially to many blue-collar Democrats, lib-
eral justices are equated with forced busing and the "coddling"
of criminals. But how does a president in his seventies say that
some justices in their seventies may have to be replaced soon?
Very carefully.""
III. ORAL ARGUMENTS
The centerpiece of the author's sabbatical project was attend-
ance at every oral argument held during the October 1984 Term.
Sometimes the arguments were dull and uninteresting, drawing
sparse crowds and virtually no public interest. Often, however, the
sessions were lively and full of excitement. This section describes
some of the major arguments of the October 1984 Term, those that
played to standing room only audiences and triggered intense media
attention.
kind of Justice they are appointing. Moreover, this was especially true of Reagan, who would
probably choose people like Robert Bork and Richard Posner, who have already displayed
their ultraconservative philosophies during their careers as federal judges. Schwartz, Rehn-
quist's Partisan Intrusion, The New York Times, Oct. 26, 1984, at A35, cols. 1-4.
22. Jerry Falwell, a fundamentalist Christian pastor, is head of the so-called "Moral
Majority." Falwell campaigned vigorously for Reagan, claiming that Reagan would likely ap-
point to the Court conservative Justices who would oppose abortions, favor school prayer, and
otherwise back the conservatives' "social agenda."
23. Polls showed that most people believed the judicial system was too soft on crime.
The majority wanted tougher, more conservative judges, not liberal, "Warren Court" types.
Interview with Chuck Rund, pollster for the Reagan-Bush reelection campaign, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1984).
24. Will, The Aging of the Court, The Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1985, at D7, cols. 1-
19861
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A. The Major Cases
1. Tennessee v. Garner"5
One of the most interesting arguments in the first month of the
Term occurred during the shoot-to-kill case, Tennessee v. Garner.
Called to the scene of a nighttime burglary of an unoccupied build-
ing, a Memphis police officer saw a fifteen year-old youth run from
the back of the building and crouch near a fence. The officer called,
"Halt, police." When the youth tried to climb the fence to escape,
the officer fatally shot him with a service revolver. The officer admit-
ted he did not believe the suspect was armed or had hurt anyone.
Memphis police policy under such circumstances was for the officer
to shoot to kill, i.e., "shoot for the mass" (torso), and the officer did
so. Tennessee law authorized shooting persons fleeing from "serious
felonies" whether or not the suspect was violent or armed. The issue
presented in the case was whether the shooting violated the suspect's
constitutional rights.
The attorneys for Memphis and Tennessee took the straightfor-
ward "leave it to the legislature" line. A dramatic point in the argu-
ment occurred when Justice Stevens induced them to admit that
flight is not even a crime under Tennessee law, and that flight is
only an offense punishable by a $50 fine under a Memphis ordi-
nance. Tennessee was therefore asking for authority to perform sum-
mary police executions for conduct punishable by a $50 fine. The
Tennessee attorneys argued that: 1) any other approach would be
"unworkable," although the attorneys then admitted they had no
idea how other states had managed this issue; 2) the policy was
"shoot-to-kill," not shoot-to-wound; and 3) the shoot-to-kill policy
could be applied to a fleeing antitrust violator if the legislature
wanted. This response to a question from Justice Blackmun evoked
shocked laughter in the courtroom.
Steven L. Winter of New York brilliantly argued the case for
the suspect's survivors, contending that the Model Penal Code rule
should be adopted and that police should only be allowed to shoot
fleeing felons when a reasonable officer would believe shooting was
necessary to protect the physical safety of the officer or others. Win-
ter's strongest point was that a majority of the states and seventy-five
percent of America's police departments had restricted shoot-to-kill
authority to situations when the officer believes the suspect is armed
and/or is likely to inflict violent injury. Winter also argued that
25. 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985).
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studies show no change in crime rates or arrest rates when restricted
shoot-to-kill policies are in effect, and that the restrictions actually
improve officer safety. This evidence seemed to eliminate all prag-
matic justification for Tennessee's brutal shoot-to-kill policy."6
The Garner oral argument left the definite impression that the
Court would strike down Tennessee's archaic shoot-to-kill law. The
main opposition during the argument came from Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and Burger.2" These three Justices pushed Winter hard,
and when the decision was issued in 1985, they dissented from the
Court's 6-3 ruling that the Tennessee law was unconstitutional.2 8
2. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises29
On election day, November 6, 1984, the Court was packed for
arguments in the Gerald R. Ford memoirs case, Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises. Harper & Row involved an
article by Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, based on a "pur-
loined copy" of Ford's not-yet-published memoirs, A Time to Heal.
The article, which contained 300 to 400 words of direct quotation
involving the most interesting passages in Ford's account of the
Nixon pardon, scooped Time's planned pre-publication article on the
same subject. As a result, Time cancelled its agreement to publish
excerpts from the memoirs and refused to pay the agreed $12,500 to
Harper & Row, which then sued Nation Enterprises for breach of
copyright. The central issue was whether the fair use doctrine 0 is
26. Thirty local police departments across the nation had filed an amicus brief opposing
Tennessee's rules.
27. Chief Justice Burger engaged Winter in an obtuse line of questioning that dramati-
cally displayed the Chief's slow-wittedness. Burger began by posing the following hypothetical:
What if, after killing the suspect, the officer had discovered that victims had been killed during
the burglary? Winter answered, correctly, that if the officer had known about the killings, he
would have been justified in shooting to kill, because the dangerousness of the burglar would
then be established. Without such knowledge, however, shooting should not be allowed. Burger
couldn't accept this. "How would the officer know?" he asked, clearly implying that'the officer
should shoot because "maybe" the burglar did in fact kill someone. Winter quite properly
explained that the law requires officers to act on what they know or should know, and that
officers should not be allowed to kill based on mere speculation. Burger then returned to the
same hypo twice more, asking the same question: "But how could the officer know whether the
burglar had killed someone?" Winter explained clearly each time, but Burger apparently could
not grasp the concept that police should be and normally are required to act on the basis of
what they know.
28. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). The dissenters argued that the "com-
pelling" need to capture burglars outweighed the suspect's interest in not being shot, especially
because the suspect chose to risk his life by fleeing.
29. 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
30. Under federal copyright law, persons who use copyrighted materials are not guilty
1986]
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inapplicable, or applicable in modified form, when the alleged copy-
right infringement precedes publication of the work.
The arguments did not reveal which way the Court was lean-
ing, but logic suggested that the Justices would favor Ford, an elder
statesman of the Republican Party, and Harper & Row, a large
publisher, against the The Nation, which is a liberal periodical.8" In
fact, when the decision came down in May 1985, all five of the
Court's Republicans (Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, and
O'Connor) voted for Ford, while three of the Court's four Demo-
crats (Brennan, White, and Marshall) voted for The Nation. Powell,
the fourth and most conservative Democrat, voted with the
Republicans.
3. FEC v. NCPAC 3'
Another major case which packed the press box and galleries
during November 1984 was FEC v. NCPAC. The case presented the
crucial question of whether the federal government may constitution-
ally limit independent expenditures by political action committees
(PAC's) on behalf of candidates in presidential elections. 8 Congress
had moved to regulate such expenditures by imposing a $1000 limit,
and the issue in FEC v. NCPAC was whether that limitation vio-
lated the first amendment.
Clearly, the restriction on campaign expenditures infringed
upon the PAC-contributors' freedom of expression. The question,
of infringement if their use is a "fair use." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
31. In predicting these outcomes based on perceived biases of the Justices, one should
keep in mind the following passages from Justice William 0. Douglas's autobiography:
[Chief Justice] Hughes made a statement to me which at the time was shatter-
ing but which over the years turned out to be true: "Justice Douglas, you must
remember one thing. At the constitutional level where we work, ninety percent
of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for
supporting out predilections."
In time I came to realize that Hughes was right when he said that a Jus-
tice's decisions were based 90 percent on emotion.
DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 8, 33 (1980).
This comment proved quite true during the October 1984 Term in general and in the
Ford memoirs case in particular. See also infra note 110 (description of the relation between
the Justices' policy views and their own respective economic profiles).
32. 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
33. Having decided that the election process would be improved by public funding, in
1971 Congress passed the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, popularly known as the
Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001 et seq., which gives candidates the choice to accept federal funds
(now $40 million) if they are willing to forego private contributions. Since then, all candidates
have accepted the public funds. This practice meant that private contributors had no one to
give their contributions to, so PAC's sprang up to fill the gap.
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then, was whether a sufficiently compelling countervailing justifica-
tion existed to overcome the first amendment's strong presumption
against such infringements. In the landmark case, Buckley v. Val-
lejo, 4 the Court held that limits on contributions to candidates are
justified by the compelling interest in avoiding corruption and the
appearance of corruption, but that limits on independent expendi-
tures by individuals on behalf of candidates are unconstitutional. 5
The open question was whether PAC's are sufficiently different
from individuals so that Buckley was not controlling.
Charles N. Steele, General Counsel for the FEC, argued that
PAC expenditures comprise a greater threat to fair elections than
expenditures by individuals. Because of their ability to amass and
spend huge sums, he argued that the PAC's distort campaigns and
threaten to corrupt the election process. Steven B. Feirson, attorney
for the National Conservative Political Action Committee, however,
contended that the expenditure limit violated the first amendment.
The FEC v. NCPAC case produced a classic role reversal
among the Justices. The conservative Justices, who usually advo-
cated restraint in exercising judicial review over other branches of
government, suddenly became wild-eyed libertarian activists in this
area because the PAC's tend to favor conservative candidates. Simi-
larly, liberal activists, who were normally staunch civil libertarians,
became blind to the first amendment values at stake, because they
wanted to restrain the big-money PAC's. The reversal vividly ap-
peared at oral argument, when Burger, O'Connor, and Rehnquist
led the attack on the FEC. The final result was a 7-2 decision hold-
ing the limit on PAC expenditures unconstitutional."6 Rehnquist
wrote the majority opinion.
4. The Establishment Clause Cases
a. Wallace v. Jaffree3 7
Of all the cases argued in the October 1984 Term, those that
generated the most public interest were three establishment clause
cases which were argued in early December. The first, Wallace v.
Jaffree, which was argued on December 4, raised once again an is-
sue which has been America's peculiar obsession since 1961-school
prayer.
34. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. 424 U.S. at 51.
36. 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
37. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
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The arguments in Wallace v. jaffree went surprisingly well for
the respondents, who attacked an Alabama statute which authorized
teachers to call for a minute of silence for meditation or prayer. A
1978 statute, which was not challenged, required teachers to an-
nounce a minute of silent meditation at the start of the day. In 1981,
another statute was passed authorizing the teachers to announce that
the minute was for "meditation or prayer." In his excellent argu-
ment for respondents, Ronnie L. Williams, a Mobile attorney,
stressed that: 1) the daily repetition of "meditation or prayer" in-
structions had the effect of advancing religion by putting the author-
ity of the teacher behind the suggestion of prayer; 2) the admitted
purpose of the statute's sponsor was to "return prayer to the public
schools;" and 3) the main effect of the teachers' repeated dwelling on
prayer was to promote prayer.
Chief Justice Burger tried repeatedly to characterize the Ala-
bama statute as merely authorizing teachers to explain the students'
first amendment rights, but Williams deftly rebutted the Chief by
pointing out that daily repetition of the right to pray explanation
amounts to promotion of prayer rather than mere explanatory teach-
ing. In contrast to Williams' effective argument, Deputy Solicitor
General Paul M. Bator, who had argued brilliantly earlier in the
Term, was faltering and unpersuasive.
Naturally, given the public's obsession with the school prayer
issue, Wallace v. Jaffree was duly reported by the networks the
night of December 4, 1984.88 On CBS, reporter Fred Graham said
that the Justices did not find anything wrong with the minute of
prayer." Yet, when the decision came down in July 1985, the Court
struck Alabama's statute down by a 5-4 vote.
b. School District v. Ball4 and Aguilar v. Felton 1
The Court was packed again the next morning for the argu-
ments in the so-called "Parochaid" cases, which were two establish-
38. On the morning of the Wallace argument, television cameras were already in place
in front of the Court. This practice was quite unusual before the arguments. A long line of
spectators waited in the cold winter morning outside of the Court. Inside, the Court was filled
with press representatives, lawyers, and the public. The press box was filled to capacity, and a
long line of press representatives were funneled off into special seats. The attorneys' section
was also full. Clearly the response was the largest of the Term.
39. Graham's report seemed misleading. Chief Justice Burger, of course, found nothing
wrong with the Alabama statute, but Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens were not so
sanguine.
40. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
41. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
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ment clause cases that challenged government aid to parochial
schools. Once again, the television cameras were out in front of the
Court, the Solicitor General's Office was represented in force, and
the celebrities' section was packed with notables, including Senator
Daniel P. Moynihan of New York.
The Grand Rapids case, School District v. Ball, was argued
first. The arguments revealed that the Justices did not favor the
Grand Rapids program. Surprisingly, even Justice White, a staunch
supporter of government aid to parochial schools, said the program
had constitutional problems. The community "leisure-time pro-
gram," in which parochial schools offered classes to part-time stu-
dents who were not among their full-time enrollment, appeared es-
pecially suspect because the program was actually administered by
parochial school personnel and taught by parochial school teachers at
their schools. The "shared-time program," in which public school
teachers conducted art, music, physical education, and remedial and
accelerated math classes for regular students in parochial school
classrooms, presented a closer issue, but White's comments suggested
that the program's legality was shakier than expected. A.E. Dick
Howard, University of Virginia law professor, argued for Ball and,
after a poor start, made a strong argument that effectively attacked
Grand Rapids' proposed "core curriculum" test. Ultimately, the
Court's decision struck down both of the Grand Rapids programs.
Arguments in Aguilar v. Felton followed. This case involved a
challenge to the use of federal Title I". funds to pay New York pub-
lic school teachers to teach remedial reading at parochial schools. Ti-
tle I presented federal aid to parochial schools in its most defensible
form, because the aid was only given to provide remedial classes for
educationally deprived children in poor areas. Solicitor General Rex
Lee's argument in support of Title I, however, was weakened by his
overly dramatic style, his reedy, piercing voice, and his faux pas of
addressing Justice Blackmun as "Justice [long pause] Brennan." In
an opinion written by the true Justice Brennan, the Court later held
the New York program unconstitutional because it "results in the
excessive entanglement of church and state.""'
5. In re Snyder"
In re Snyder, which was argued in April, 1985, presented an-
42. 20 U.S.C. § 2701 (1965).
43. 105 S. Ct. at 3237 (1985).
44. 105 S. Ct. 2874 (1985).
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other fascinating oral argument. Snyder, an attorney, was appointed
to represent an indigent criminal defendant. After completing the
work, Snyder submitted his claim for attorney's fees. The Eighth
Circuit sent the claim back for more details. Snyder's second submis-
sion was also sent back, because the form was incorrect. Frustrated,
Snyder sent a sharply worded letter to a court secretary, saying inter
alia, that he was "appalled" at the level of payment and "extremely
disgusted" by the treatment of the claim for fees; that, with regard to
the form of the claim, the court could "take it or leave it;" and that
his name should be removed from the list of attorneys willing to take
appointments.
The Eighth Circuit's response was shocking. When its demand
for an apology was refused, it issued a show cause order, demanded
an apology at the hearing, and suspended Snyder for six months af-
ter he refused to apologize. This response was too harsh even for the
authoritarian Burger Court. The Justices hounded the Eighth Cir-
cuit's attorney, who responded with an equivocating and evasive ar-
gument. Even the conservative Justices indicated that the suspension
was improper.
The Snyder oral arguments had several interesting elements.
Snyder's attorney, David L. Peterson of Bismark, North Dakota, ir-
ritated the Justices when he tried to skip several nonconstitutional
theories and jump right into the first amendment issue of whether
the suspension violated Snyder's freedoms of speech and petition. In-
deed, the case offered the Court a wonderful opportunity to define
the first amendment rights of lawyers with new clarity. Instead, the
Justices pushed Peterson relentlessly regarding nonconstitutional
theories,48 and Justice Stevens castigated both Peterson and the amici
for failing to address these theories adequately. The Justices pursued
the nonconstitutional analysis so hard that Peterson never reached
his first amendment arguments. It was both an object lesson and a
warning to attorneys not to hastily attempt to reach constitutional
issues.
The Eighth Circuit's attorney, John J. Greer of Spencer, Iowa,
found himself in trouble after refusing to deal candidly with the facts
of the case. Snyder's suspension clearly resulted from his refusal to
apologize for what the Eighth Circuit judges felt was the "disre-
spectful tone" of Snyder's letter. Yet Greer tried to deny this and
45. The main alternative theory was that a single rude letter did not constitute "conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar" sufficient to support a suspension under F.R. App. P. 46.
See infra note 46.
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pretend that the suspension resulted from Snyder's refusal to submit
proper vouchers and from his withdrawal from future representation
of indigents. The Justices did not agree. Moreover, Greer com-
pounded his problems by trying to "backdoor" the disrespect theme
into the case, saying the suspension was based on the "totality" of
Snyder's conduct. This equivocation forfeited Greer's remaining
credibility.
Chief Justice Burger, more alert and involved in this argument
than usual, pushed repeatedly for concessions that Snyder could and
should have communicated in more respectful terms. White, how-
ever, countered Burger by pointing out that Snyder's forceful letter
did actually shake the Eighth Circuit into changing its procedures.
Burger finally backed off, pointing out that the letter was to a secre-
tary, and not to a judge; that, if the vouchers were inadequate, the
appropriate response was to deny the claim for fees rather than to
suspend the attorney; and that the Eighth Circuit had demanded an
apology, thus showing that it was disciplining Snyder for his expres-
sion rather than merely for his noncompliance with technical rules.
When the decision came down several months later, the Court ruled
against the Eighth Circuit, but did so on nonconstitutional
grounds.'
6. Sedima v. Imrex Company4" and National Bank v.
Haroco'8
Two cases argued on April 17, 1985, Sedima v. Imrex Company
and National Bank v. Haroco, involved the important question of
whether the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)49 may be used against legitimate businesses. The cases were
of tremendous interest to the corporate bar, and the oral arguments
drew a standing room only crowd of attorneys.
In Sedima, the Second Circuit held that civil RICO liability
may not be imposed absent both a prior criminal conviction for pred-
icate acts listed in RICO, and a "RICO injury" or a "racketeering
injury" distinct from the injury caused by the predicate crimes. In
46. In re Snyder, 105 S. Ct. 2874 (1985). The Court ruled simply that a single incident
of "unlawyer-like rudeness" does not compromise sufficient "conduct unbecoming a member of
the bar" to support suspension.
47. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
48. 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970). RICO imposes civil liability for treble damages and
attorney's fees against persons who, in conducting an enterprise, engage in a pattern of racke-
teering and commit two or more of the "predicate offenses" listed in the statute.
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Haroco, the Seventh Circuit held that a "racketeering enterprise in-
jury" is a prerequisite to RICO civil liability. The Burger Court had
to decide whether to adopt these or other limits to protect legitimate
businesses from civil RICO suits.50
The Justices were obviously struggling with this problem dur-
ing the oral arguments. RICO is a complex statute. Stevens said he
had read it "about a million times" and still did not understand it.
The cases were hard to call, because they involved cross-cutting so-
cial policies that put the Justices into a double-bind situation. The
main interests in the cases were law-and-order, protectionism for big
business, and judicial door-closing. Normally the dominant conserva-
tive wing was unwilling to restrict the scope of criminal statutes.
Here, however, a law-and-order approach would both expose big
business, one of the conservatives' main allies, to serious problems,
and invite an enormous amount of federal litigation. This was the
last thing the conservatives wanted. Ultimately, the conservatives
stuck to their law-and-order views, and refused to create an excep-
tion to protect big business from RICO. The liberals dissented, vot-
ing to create an exception that would favor big business. 1
B. The Oral Advocates
1. The Solicitor General's Office
The most visible group of attorneys at oral arguments during
the October 1984 Term was the Solicitor General and his staff.
These Justice Department attorneys represent the United States and
its agencies in litigation before the Supreme Court. The members of
the Solicitor's Office performed impressively, winning the bulk of
their arguments. In general, they seemed to have a sounder approach
to oral arguments and a better grasp of the Court's thinking than did
outside attorneys.
50. Congress's main purpose in enacting RICO was to attack "organized crime," i.e.,
criminal syndicates like the Mafia. But instead, Congress ended up enacting very broad statu-
tory language. The list of predicate offenses, for example, includes loan sharking, narcotics
sales, gambling, prostitution, and other activities characteristic of crime families, but it also
contains the following "big three:" mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities violations. The big
three cover most garden variety business torts and thus expose legitimate business organiza-
tions to RICO suits. The carrots of treble damages and attorney's fees have induced the plain-
tiffs' bar to transform a wide variety of commercial claims into RICO claims, and the result is
a flood of federal court litigation seeking to impose RICO civil liability on business corpora-
tions. In response, lower federal courts began formulating, or inventing, one might say, restric-
tions on RICO civil suits which were designed to dam the flood and protect legitimate busi-
nesses from RICO.
51. Sedima v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
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Solicitor General Rex E. Lee was the most prominent of all the
attorneys who argued before the Supreme Court in the October 1984
Term. Lee argued a series of important cases during the Term, in-
cluding the state autonomy case,52 the draft registration case,' the
Haitian refugees case,' 4 the "Parochaid" case," and the regional
banking case.56
Lee's arguments were, for the most part, unimpressive, and he
endured several embarrassing moments. One such moment occurred
during Lowe v. SEC,' 7 when he looked like a Court jester during a
give-and-take with Justice Stevens. Stevens posited a hypothetical in
which the government banned the publication of law review articles
by law students. Lee hesitated and then said seriously, "Justice Ste-
vens, that is at the very edge of what is permissible." Spectators
broke out laughing at this answer."
Other members of the Solicitor General's Office played impor-
tant roles as oral advocates in the October 1984 Term. Lawrence
Wallace, the senior member of the office, argued several cases.59
Wallace had a strange, breathless style of oral argument that gave an
impression of nervousness, but his thinking was clear and forceful,
and his arguments, while awkward, were effective.
One of the most effective advocates of the Term was Deputy
Solicitor General Andrew L. Frey, the government's leading attorney
in criminal cases. A stocky man with salt-and-pepper hair and
beard, and his stomach protruding from under his vest, Frey made
several excellent arguments which were low-key, knowledgeable, ra-
tional, persuasive, and punctuated by strange little blasts of air into
52. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
53. Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985).
54. Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985).
55. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
56. Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
57. 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
58. Lee announced his resignation on April 30, 1985. He considered his biggest victories
to be enhancing executive power vis-a-vis Congress and the judiciary, increasing the use of
illegally obtained evidence, approval of tax deductions for parochial school tuition, and restrict-
ing affirmative action. See Kamen, U.S. Solicitor General Lee Resigning Amid Controversy,
The Washington Post, May 1, 1985, at A4, cols. 1-4. His biggest loss was the failure to roll
back the constitutional right to abortion. Id. at col. 1. Lee dismissed conservative demands for
more aggressive pressure on the Court as tactically unsound. "It's a question of what you can
get away with, how far you can push the Supreme Court or move the Supreme Court in the
direction you want to go . . . . I can breathe fire with the rest of them, [but] you have to play
for the long run." Id. at col. 2.
59. Wallace has argued over 80 U.S. Supreme Court cases, more than any other twenti-
eth century attorney except the great New York lawyer John W. Davis, and former Solicitor
General Irwin Griswold.
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his nasal cavity. Frey usually took the hard-line, law-and-order
position."
2. The Harvard Professors
The second most prominent group of attorneys who argued dur-
ing the October 1984 Term were four Harvard professors, Paul Ba-
tor, Charles Fried, Lawrence Tribe, and Arthur Miller, all of whom
were among the Term's very best oral advocates."1
Bator, a conservative intellectual, argued three cases, at times
with an elegance unsurpassed by any other attorney. His best show-
ing occurred in the second case argued during the Term, Alexander
v. Choate.6" This case addressed the issue of whether Tennessee's
reduction of free hospital services from twenty to fourteen days per
year illegally discriminated against handicapped persons. Bator made
an impressive argument in favor of the legality of the cut, using the
classic approach of reductio ad absurdam, claiming that appellee's
position would make all limits on hospitalization illegal. This claim
became the crux of the subsequent discussion. All the Justices
wanted to know whether any limit was available to Tennessee that
would not have a discriminatory impact on some group of handi-
capped persons and thus would not be subject to the same challenge.
Ultimately, the Court upheld Tennessee's action on the ground that
it did not deny handicapped persons "meaningful access" to free
hospitalization.
Bator also argued the closely-watched school prayer case, Wal-
lace v. Jaffree,68 in which he fared much more poorly, and the John
Mitchell domestic wiretap case, Mitchell v. Forsyth,4 in which he
performed successfully. Bator's nomination for a federal judgeship
was withdrawn during the Term for unspecified personal reasons,
and he returned to Harvard.
Charles Fried, another Harvard professor, was appointed to
take Bator's place in the Solicitor General's Office. Fried handled
the argument and re-argument in Pattern Makers' League v.
60. Given Frey's consistent law-and-order position, it was ironic that his nomination for
federal .judge was withdrawn during the Term because of conservative opposition based on his
support of Planned Parenthood and a gun control organization.
61. Bator and Fried were actually second-in-command in the Solicitor General's Office
during the Term. Fried succeeded Bator in early 1985, when Bator returned to Harvard.
62. 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985).
63. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
64. 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985).
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NLRB.6" This case tested whether a union may fine former members
for quitting a union and then returning to work during a strike in
violation of a union rule. Fried invoked the well-settled rule that the
Court should defer to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
as long as the NLRB action is not contrary to the fundamental
structure of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Fried as-
serted that the NLRB's action was quite consistent with the funda-
mental concepts of the NLRA in that it preserved the Act's symme-
try by holding that the right to refrain from collective action, like the
right to engage in collective action, is fully protected and may not be
bargained away. Fried's forceful arguments were among the best of
the Term, 6 and he won the Pattern Makers' case by a narrow five-
to-four vote.67
Lawrence H. Tribe, renowned constitutional scholar and Su-
preme Court advocate, was the third Harvard law professor to ap-
pear before the Court during the October 1984 Term. Tribe argued
three cases, including the important regional banking case, Northeast
Bancorp v. Board of Governors,s in which he was co-counsel with
Rex Lee. Tribe's arguments were impressive but not overwhelming.
At one point in the Board of Education v. National Gay Task
Force"' argument, Rehnquist and Tribe both insisted on talking at
the same time, making what they said completely unintelligible and
drawing a laugh from the audience.
The fourth and last of the Harvard professors was Arthur R.
Miller, who made one of the best arguments of the Term in Phillips
Petroleum Company v. Shutts,70 a complex civil procedure case in-
volving due process rules for plaintiffs' class actions. Miller was es-
pecially effective in dealing with difficult standing issues that many
attorneys who argued during the Term were unable to handle.
3. Other Illustrious Advocates
Norton J. Come, dean of American labor lawyers, made several
appearances, including one in NLRB v. International Longshore-
65. 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
66. After Rex Lee resigned, Fried became Acting Solicitor General, and he was later
promoted to Solicitor General, a position which he still held at the date of this writing, Febru-
ary, 1986.
67. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
68. 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
69. 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
70. 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).
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men's Association (ILA II),71 which involved a battle between the
longshoremen and the teamsters. Come, who has a gravelly voice and
a low-key, deliberate style, has argued more than fifty Supreme
Court cases since he joined the NLRB in 1958.72
Other famous advocates argued during the October 1984 Term.
Former Columbia law professor and federal judge Marvin Frankel
argued twice, once against another former federal judge, Harold
Tyler. University of Virginia law professor A.E. Dick Howard ar-
gued once. The Washington, D.C. and New York City bars were
admirably represented by numerous advocates.
IV. CONFLICT ON THE COURT
The 1984-85 Burger Court was characterized by relatively har-
monious relationships among the Justices. The spicy conflicts de-
picted in The Brethren 7  were either nonexistent or hidden from
public view. The Justices were amicable during oral arguments,
avoiding the kind of courtroom hostilities with which Justices War-
ren and Frankfurter entertained the public in the late 1950s and
early 1960s. Moreover, Supreme Court staff members kept up the
solid front and steadfastly denied the existence of any secret wars
among the Justices.
The standard line taken by the Justices was that the Burger
Court was a team working together to get the job done. Justice Ste-
vens, for example, said that the Court is more of a team than most
people think and that The Brethren exaggerated the degree of ani-
mosity among the Justices.74 Stevens said that despite ideological dif-
ferences, the current Court has harmonious interpersonal relations
and less tension than the Vinson Court had in 1947-48, when Ste-
vens clerked for Justice Rutledge. Stevens mentioned Powell as a
unifying figure who is respected by all the Justices. Justice Brennan
also asserted that there was no serious friction between the
71. 105 S. Ct. 3045 (1985).
72. Come confirmed the popular thesis that Justice Brennan has had a disproportionate
influence on the Burger Court's labor law jurisprudence. Come also said, however, that the
days of the "Brennan Court" were ending. He added that it has become increasingly difficult
for him to argue NLRB positions before Court, because many are contrary to earlier pro-labor
NLRB and Court precedents. According to Come, his arguments before the Court now twist
him into "a pretzel." Interview with Norton Come, Washington, D.C. (June 24, 1985).
73. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
74. Interview with Justice John P. Stevens in Washington, D.C. (April-2, 1985). New
York Times Court reporter Linda Greenhouse also contended that THE BRETHREN gave a
false impression by focusing on the most divisive cases of the 1969-76 period. Interview with
Linda Greenhouse, Washington, D.C. (April 24, 1985).
[Vol. 26
THE OCTOBER 1984 TERM
Justices.7 5
The only solid evidence of intra-Court conflict came from the
speeches and opinions of the Justices themselves. First came a speech
by Stevens on August 4, 1984, criticizing "my present colleagues' en-
thusiastic attempts to codify the law instead of merely performing
the judicial task of deciding the cases that come before them."'7 6 Ste-
vens criticized several decisions, including the landmark Stotts,"
Grove City College,78 and Leon 79 cases, as illustrations of this
pattern:
In Firefighters Union v. Stotts, a case that required nothing
more than the construction of the terms of a consent decree, the
Court elected to make a far reaching pronouncement concerning
the limits on a court's power to prescribe affirmative action as a
remedy for a proven violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. In Grove City College,... the Court went out of its way to
announce that the statute did not forbid sex discrimination
throughout the assisted institution even though neither party ar-
gued that it did . . . . In the Leon and Sheppard cases, the
Court leaped at the opportunity to promulgate the widely her-
alded good faith exception to the exclusionary rule without even
pausing to consider whether the rule itself was applicable.
Justice Marshall, speaking at the September 14, 1984 Confer-
ence of the Second Circuit, delivered what one commentator called a
"sharp denunciation of recent decisions by the court's conservative
majority.""8 Marshall contended that decisions issued in the October
1983 Term revealed "a very disturbing pattern:"
The Court seems to concede in each case that important federal
rights are at issue and that they may have been violated. It then
denies the victims the only effective remedies to those violations.
Almost as an after-thought, it sometimes suggests that the vic-
tims pursue other remedies, and it then offers ones that will
have little or no effect .... Where no remedies are offered, or
where the only ones offered can accomplish little, those who
need protection will have reason to turn away from the legal
system. They will be convinced that their rights are being trivi-
75. Interview with Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Washington, D.C. (May 6, 1985).
76. Remarks by Justice John P. Stevens, Dedication of Arthur Rubloff Building,
Northwestern University School of Law, Aug. 1, 1984.
77. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
78. Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
79. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
80. Berbash, Marshall Hits High Court Rulings, The Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1984,
at A4, col. 1.
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alized more than they are being protected.8
A few days later, Justice Blackmun joined the chorus by giving
a speech to the Washington, D.C. Cosmos Club in which he charged
that the Court's Majority was reaching out to achieve its conserva-
tive goals even when the cases did not so require.8" According to
Blackmun, the Court had recently tended to "decide more than the
case requires," 88 and was going "where it wants . . . by hook or by
crook."'" Blackmum fueled speculation about growing tension on the
Court, saying, "Extremism is increasingly showing up in opinions
.. .because of a 'lack of accommodation' among the Justices."8
Justice Brennan gave two speeches during the October 1984
Term which expressed his displeasure with the Court's decisions.
Speaking to members of the Mercer University Law Review on Octo-
ber 23, 1984, Brennan echoed Marshall's charge that the Court had
"condoned both isolated and systematic violations of civil liberties" in
recent cases.8 Brennan referred repeatedly to cases favoring the gov-
ernment over the individual and claimed they are "a departure from
tested constitutional standards. 87 Returning to a theme he had re-
peated since the 1970s, Brennan said, "[miore and more Americans
are turning to state courts for relief in defending constitutional rights
because they are afraid that the U.S. Supreme Court won't help
them."88
In a May 2, 1985 speech at the seventy-ninth annual dinner of
the American Jewish Committee, Brennan made an unusually
pointed attack on the current Court, voicing many of the themes he
had articulated in his dissents. According to Brennan:
81. Remarks of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit,
Hartford, Conn., Sept. 14, 1984.
82. See Kamen, Blackmun Says "Weary" Court Is Shifting Right, The Washington
Post, Sept. 20, 1984, at 1, cols. 3-5.
83. Id. at A42, col. 3.
84. Id. at 1, col. 3.
85. Id. at col. 4. Blackmun also "described the court as weary and overworked, a place
where there is now 'very little humor.' " Id. at col. 2. He added that his job was "a rotten way
to earn a living" and "no way to live." Id. at cols. 2, 3.
Conceivably, Blackmun felt the pressure more than the other Justices, in part because, as
author of the original right-of-abortion opinion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), he was
under constant pressure from anti-abortion activists. Police protection at the Court was
doubled on Oct. 10, 1984, because of a death threat sent to Blackmun. A bullet was shot
through the window of Blackmun's residence later in the Term. See Specter, Shot Fired
Through Blackmun's Window, The Washington Post, March 5, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
86. Brennan Says Rulings Violated Civil Liberties, The Washington Post, Oct. 25,
1984, at 1, col. 1.
87. Id. at col. 2.
88. Id. at col. 1.
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[I]ncreasingly Court watchers are asking ... isn't the Court
these days becoming primarily concerned with vindicating the
will of the majority and less interested in its role as a protector
of the individual's constitutional rights? ...
I cannot deny that there has been a startling difference be-
tween decisions handed down by the Court in 1963-20 years
ago-and the decisions handed down in 1983. In 1963, constitu-
tional claims were sustained by the Court in 86 percent of the
cases presenting them and rejected in only 14 percent of the
cases. In 1983, in disturbing contrast, the figures were almost
precisely reversed: constitutional claims were sustained in only
19 percent of the cases and rejected in 81 percent."
Friction between the Court's liberal and conservative wings was
also evident in some of the opinions issued during the October 1984
Term. Perhaps the most vivid example was Oregon v. Elstad,90
which struck what Brennan's dissent called "a potentially crippling
blow to Miranda"' by holding that the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine 2 does not apply to Miranda" violations. Elstad sparked an
unusually sharp exchange of charges among the Justices. Brennan's
dissent included the following:
The Court's decision says much about the way the Court
currently goes about implementing its agenda. In imposing its
new rule, for example, the Court mischaracterizes our prece-
dents, obfuscates the central issues, and altogether ignores the
practical realities of custodial interrogation that have led nearly
every lower court to reject its simplistic reasoning. Moreover,
the Court adopts startling and unprecedented methods of con-
struing constitutional guarantees. Finally, the Court reaches out
once again to address issues not before us . . . .Today's deci-
sion, in short, threatens disastrous consequences far beyond the
outcome in this case . . . .It is but the latest of the escalating
number of decisions that are making this tribunal increasingly
irrelevant in the protection of individual rights, and that are re-
quiring other tribunals to shoulder the burden."
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion responded by calling Brennan's
89. Remarks of Justice William J. Brennan to the 79th Annual Dinner of the American
Jewish Committee, New York, N.Y., May 2, 1985.
90. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
91. Id. at 1299.
92. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
93. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (warnings required prior to custodial
police interrogations).
94. 105 S. Ct. 1299, 1322 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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analysis "wholly unpersuasive"" and asserted that Justice Brennan,
"with an apocalyptic tone, heralds this opinion as dealing a 'crip-
pling blow to Miranda.' . . . [He] not only distorts the reasoning and
holding of our decision, but, worse, invites trial courts and prosecu-
tors to do the same.""
Brennan's anger about the Burger Court's evisceration of con-
stitutional liberties was also evident in Wainwright v. Witt,"' which
softened the test for excluding persons opposed to capital punishment
from sitting on juries in capital cases. Labelling Rehnquist's majority
opinion as "brazenly revisionist,"" "unpardonable,"" and a "bit of
legerdemain,"'100 Brennan's dissent castigated the Majority for al-
lowing states to place the fate of capital defendants in the hands of
hanging juries.'01 Brennan's dissent concluded with the following at-
tack on the Burger Court's approach to criminal cases:
Today's opinion for the Court is the product of a saddening
confluence of . . . the most disturbing trends in our constitu-
tional jurisprudence respecting the fundamental rights of our
people .... These trends all reflect the same desolate truth: we
have lost our sense of the transcendant importance of the Bill of
Rights to our society .... Like the death-qualified juries that
the prosecution can now mold to its will to enhance the chances
of victory, this Court increasingly acts as the adjunct of the
State and its prosecutors in facilitating efficient and expedient
conviction and execution irrespective of the Constitution's fun-
damental guarantees. One can only hope that this day too will
soon pass.'"
Despite such occasional outbursts of angry criticism in speeches
and dissenting opinions, the general feeling was that the 1984-85
Burger Court was not inclined to hang its dirty laundry out in pub-
lic view. The Court was, in fact, relatively peaceful and harmonious,
at least compared to the days when Douglas, Black, and Warren
exchanged fire with Frankfurter and Jackson. 0 8
95. Id. at 1295.
96. Id. at 1285 n.5.
97. 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
98. Id. at 866.
99. Id. at 871.
100. Id. at 870.
101. Id. at 871.
102. Id. at 872-73.
103. For a vivid discussion of the hostilities on the early Warren Court, see SCHWARTZ
& LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 49-67 (1983).
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V. CONCLUSION
As the October 1984 Term moved toward its conclusion and the
decisions came down in large numbers, a consensus began to emerge
among commentators that the Term was less conservative than ex-
pected. On May 5, 1985, for example, Washington Post court re-
porter Al Kamen wrote that the October 1984 Term had so far been
a "dramatic reversal" of the conservative October 1983 Term in civil
liberties cases. 10 4 Similarly, ACLU Legal Director Burt Neuborne,
who had earlier compared himself to Napoleon's general left behind
to cover the retreat from Russia, reported, "We are holding our
own."
105
New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse,
however, cautioned that the character of a Term can never be known
until the end-of-Term crunch, when many of the hotly-contested
cases are announced" 6 Sure enough, the conservative wing came on
strong during June and July 1985 and reclaimed statistical domi-
nance over the liberals.10 7
104. Kamen, High Court Reverses Trend: Individuals Win More Civil Liberties Cases,
The Washington Post, May 5, 1985, at Al, cols. 2-4. According to Kamen:
Individuals have won more than half of the civil liberties cases reaching the
Supreme Court this year, a dramatic reversal of last year, when the government
won eight of every 10 such cases ....
Last term, the court ruled on 69 civil liberties cases, which are those pitting
individual constitutional rights against government authority. It decided 13 in
favor of the individual and 56 in favor of the government ....
But, this year, individuals have won 15 of 28 decisions in cases raising civil
liberties issues.
Id. at col. 3.
105. Id. at col. 1. Paul Bator, who had returned to Harvard, suggested, "The outcry
last year criticizing the [Clourt for a rightward lunge might have had some effect." Id. at A14,
col. 2.
106. Interview with Linda Greenhouse in Washington, D.C. (April 24, 1985).
107. Brennan dissented in ten of the Term's last 13 decisions and disagreed with Rehn-
quist and Burger in 12. The conservative wing won ten of the final 12 split decisions: Corne-
lius v. N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985) (5-2
decision) (free speech); Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 105 S. Ct.
3420 (1985) (7-2 decision) (Indian lands); Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401 (1985) (6-3
decision) (criminal procedure); United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985) (5-3 decision)
(criminal procedure); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 105 S. Ct.
3346 (1985) (5-3 decision) (arbitrability of international antitrust claims); United States v. De
Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985) (7-2 decision) (criminal procedure); Sedima v. Imrex Co.,
105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985) (5-4 decision) (RICO civil liability); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (6-3 decision) (equal protection); Walters v. National
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985) (6-3 decision) (procedural due process);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985) (5-4 decision) (eleventh
amendment).
The liberal wing won two of the 12: Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) (5-4
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The overall voting data suggested that it was business-as-usual
for the conservative Burger Court during the October 1984 Term.
The conservatives won the lions' share of divided cases during the
Term. The liberals, Brennan and Marshall, posted the highest dis-
sent rates on the Court, which were roughly two and one-half times
as high as Burger and O'Connor's. White and Powell were substan-
tially right of center. Blackmun was roughly in the statistical center.
Stevens was a little left of center. Rehnquist, of course, joined Burger
and O'Connor on the far right.
The only changes from prior Terms were minor ones. Burger
moved back to the right of O'Connor, resuming the second-most-con-
servative slot that he held throughout the 1970's.' °8 White moved to
the right of Powell.109 Stevens was closer to the Court's statistical
center than in earlier Terms, when he was substantially left of
center. Blackmun was in the center for the second straight Term,
after his sojourn in the left wing during the 1981-83 period. 1
Despite its end-of-Term conservative rally, the October 1984
Term will probably be remembered as more moderate than its pred-
decision) (establishment clause), and Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216
(1985) (5-4 decision) (establishment clause). The one unanimous decision in the last thirteen
cases was Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 105 U.S. 3325 (1985) (article
III). Separate opinions concurring only in the judgment were filed in Thomas on behalf of
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun.
108. See Galloway, The First Decade of the Burger Court: Conservative Dominance
(1969-1979), 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 891 (1981).
109. Powell's voting pattern may have been skewed by his 43 absences following sur-
gery to remove cancer of his prostate. Powell's absence resulted in eight 4-4 splits, a modern
record, and elicited a burst of commentary concerning his critical role on the Court. An April
I, 1985 article, for example, argued that the current Court is "sharply divided," and that
Powell often controls the outcome in close cases. Kamen, Powell Acts as Court Majority-
Maker: Virginian Is Swing Vote on Divided Bench, The Washington Post, April 1, 1985, at
Al, cols. 4-6. In addition to the 4-4 votes in cases argued during Powell's absence, Kamen
pointed out that there had been nine 5-4 decisions to date in the Term, and Powell had been
in the majority eight times. Id. Kamen concluded, "Powell so far this term has been the court's
decisive figure, its swing man and majoritymaker." Id. at col. 5. Similarly, an editorial in The
Washington Post stated that Powell has a "rather remarkable role on this tribunal: He is more
than many had realized, the pivotal decision-maker, the justice whose vote in close cases is
almost always the decisive one." Justice Powell in the Center, The Washington Post, April 4,
1985, at A16, col. 1.
110. Interestingly, 1985 financial statements filed by the Justices reveal that the Jus-
tices' policy views rather closely reflect their economic profiles. The conservative four horseper-
sons are the first, second, third, and fifth wealthiest members of the Court. Powell is first at
$2.6 to $5.6 million. O'Connor is next at $996,000 to $2.2 million. Burger is third at $665,000
to $1.02 million. Rehnquist is fifth at $169,000 to 470,000, just behind Blackmun.
The liberals are poorest. Marshall is last at $5,000 to $15,000. Brennan has $56,000 to
$190,000. Stevens, the third most liberal Justice, has $35,000 to $115,000.
The moderates are in the middle. White reports $60,000 to $200,000. Blackmun has
$216,000 to $630,000. These figures do not include the value of the Justices' homes.
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ecessor."' The liberal wing won some major victories, overturning
National League of Cities,"2 sweeping the four establishment clause
cases, and declaring Tennessee's shoot-to-kill law unconstitutional.
When all the votes were counted, however, it was still conservative
dominance, Burger Court style, that characterized the Term. The
conservative wing prevailed in seven out of eight divided fourth
amendment cases, eight of nine free speech cases, and many more
cases covering a wide variety of issues. By the end of the Term, the
Court's short-range direction seemed unclear, and commentators"a
wondered whether the 1985-86 Court would resume the reactionary
course of the October 1983 Term or continue the more moderate
pattern of the October 1984 Term.
111. See, e.g., Kamen, supra note 104; E. WITT, A DIFFERENT JUSTICE 2 (1985). As
Elder Witt, Court analyst for the Congressional Quarterly, put it, "[11n the term . . . from
October 1984 through June 1985, the Court moved back toward the moderate center and away
from the unremitting conservatism of the previous term." Id.
112. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
113. E.g., E. Wrrr, supra note I11.
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